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Abstract
Many questions in experimental mathematics are fundamentally inductive in nature. Here we
demonstrate how Bayesian inference –the logic of partial beliefs– can be used to quantify the evidence
that finite data provide in favor of a general law. As a concrete example we focus on the general
law which posits that certain fundamental constants (i.e., the irrational numbers pi, e,
√
2, and ln 2)
are normal; specifically, we consider the more restricted hypothesis that each digit in the constant’s
decimal expansion occurs equally often. Our analysis indicates that for each of the four constants,
the evidence in favor of the general law is overwhelming. We argue that the Bayesian paradigm is
particularly apt for applications in experimental mathematics, a field in which the plausibility of a
general law is in need of constant revision in light of data sets whose size is increasing continually
and indefinitely.
Introduction
Experimental mathematics focuses on data and computation in order to address and discover mathe-
matical questions that have so far escaped formal proof [Bailey and Borwein, 2009]. In many cases, this
means that mathematical conjectures are examined by studying their consequences for a large range
of data; every time a consequence is confirmed this increases one’s confidence in the veracity of the
conjecture. Complete confidence in the truth or falsehood of a conjecture can only be achieved with
the help of a rigorous mathematical proof. Nevertheless, in between absolute truth and falsehood there
exist partial beliefs, the intensity of which can be quantified using the rules of probability calculus
[Borel, 1965, Ramsey, 1926].
Thus, an important role in experimental mathematics is played by heuristic reasoning and induction.
Even in pure mathematics, inductive processes facilitate novel development:
“every mathematician with some experience uses readily and effectively the same method
that Euler used which is basically the following: To examine a theorem T , we deduce from
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Bayesian Evidence Accumulation
it some easily verifiable consequences C1, C2, C3, . . . . If one of these consequences is found
to be false, theorem T is refuted and the question is decided. But if all the consequences
C1, C2, C3, . . . happen to be valid, we are led after a more or less lengthy sequence of ver-
ifications to an ‘inductive’ conviction of the validity of theorem T . We attain a degree of
belief so strong that it seems superfluous to make any ulterior verifications.” [Polya, 1941,
pp. 455-456]
Here we illustrate how to formalize the process of induction for a venerable problem in experimental
mathematics: we will quantify degree of belief in the statement that particular irrational numbers (i.e.,
pi, e,
√
2, and ln 2) are normal, or, more specifically, that the 10 digits of their decimal expansions
occur equally often. This illustration does not address the more complicated question of whether all
sequences of digits occur equally often: the sequence studied here is of length 1. Nevertheless, the
simplified problem highlights the favorable properties of the general method and can be extended to
more complicated scenarios.
To foreshadow the conclusion, our study shows that there is overwhelming evidence in favor of the
general law that all digits in the decimal expansion of pi, e,
√
2, and ln 2 occur equally often. Our
statistical analysis improves on standard frequentist inference in several major ways that we elaborate
upon below.
Bayes Factors to Quantify Evidence for General Laws
In experimental mathematics, the topic of interest often concerns the possible existence of a general
law. This law –sometimes termed the null hypothesis H0– specifies an invariance (e.g., pi is normal) that
imposes some sort of restriction on the data (e.g., the digits of the decimal expansion of pi occur equally
often). The negation of the general law –sometimes termed the alternative hypothesis H1– relaxes the
restriction imposed by the general law.
In order to quantify the evidence that the data provide for or against a general law, [Jeffreys, 1961]
developed a formal system of statistical inference whose centerpiece is the following equation
[Wrinch and Jeffreys, 1921, p. 387]:
p(H0 | data)
p(H1 | data)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Posterior odds
=
p(H0)
p(H1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prior odds
× p(data | H0)
p(data | H1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bayes factor BF01
. (1)
Jeffreys’s work focused on the Bayes factor, which is the change from prior to posterior model odds
brought about by the data. The Bayes factor also quantifies the relatively predictive adequacy of the
models under consideration, and the log of the Bayes factor is the weight of evidence provided by the
data [Kass and Raftery, 1995]. When BF01 = 10 this indicates that the data are 10 times more likely
under H0 than under H1; when BF01 = .2 this indicates that the data are 5 times more likely under H1
than under H0.
Let H0 be specified by a series of nuisance parameters ζ and, crucially, a parameter of interest that
is fixed at a specific value, θ = θ0. Then H1 is specified using similar nuisance parameters ζ, but in
addition H1 releases the restriction on θ. In order to obtain the Bayes factor one needs to integrate out
the model parameters as follows:
BF01 =
∫
Z
p(data | θ0, ζ,H0) p(ζ | θ0,H0) dζ∫
Θ
∫
Z
p(data | θ, ζ,H1) p(θ, ζ | H1) dζ dθ . (2)
Equation 2 reveals several properties of Bayes factor inference that distinguish it from frequentist
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inference using p values. First, the Bayes factor contrasts two hypotheses, the general law and its
negation. Consequently, it is possible to quantify evidence in favor of the general law (i.e., whenever
BF01 > 1). As we will see below, one of our tests for the first 100 million digits of pi produces BF01 =
1.86× 1030, which is overwhelming evidence in favor of the law that the digits of the decimal expansion
of pi occur equally often; in contrast, a non-significant p value can only suggest a failure to reject H0
(e.g., [Frey, 2009]). Moreover, as we will demonstrate below, the evidential meaning of a p value changes
with sample size [Lindley, 1957]. This is particularly problematic for the study of the behavior of decimal
expansions, since there can be as many as 10 trillion digits under consideration.
Second, the Bayes factor respects the probability calculus and allows coherent updating of beliefs;
specifically, consider two batches of data, y1 and y2. Then, BF01(y1, y2) = BF01(y1) × BF01(y2 | y1):
the Bayes factor for the joint data set can be decomposed as the product of the Bayes factor for the
first batch multiplied by the Bayes factor for the second batch, conditional on the information ob-
tained from the first data set. Consequently –and in contrast to p value inference– Bayes factors
can be seamlessly updated as new data arrive, indefinitely and without a well-defined sampling plan
[Berger and Berry, 1988a, Berger and Berry, 1988b]. This property is particularly relevant for the study
of normality of fundamental constants, since new computational and mathematical developments con-
tinually increase the length of the decimal expansion [Wrench Jr, 1960].
The Normality of Irrational Numbers
A real number x is normal in base b if all of the digit sequences in its base b expansion occur equally
often (e.g., [Borel, 1909]); consequently, each string of t consecutive digits has limiting frequency b−t.
In our example, we consider the decimal expansion and focus on strings of length 1. Hence, normality
entails that each digit occurs with limiting frequency 1/10.
The conjecture that certain fundamental constants –irrational numbers such as pi, e,
√
2,
and ln 2– are normal has attracted much scientific scrutiny (e.g., [Bailey and Borwein, 2009,
Bailey and Crandall, 2001, Borwein et al., 2004]). Aside from theoretical interest and practical appli-
cation, the enduring fascination with this topic may be due in part to the paradoxical result that the
digits sequences are perfectly predictable yet apparently appear random:
“Plenty of arrangements in which design had a hand [...] would be quite indistinguishable
in their results from those in which no design whatever could be traced. Perhaps the most
striking case in point here is to be found in the arrangement of the digits in one of the
natural arithmetical constants, such as pi or e, or in a table of logarithms. If we look to the
process of production of these digits, no extremer instance can be found of what we mean
by the antithesis of randomness: every figure has its necessarily pre-ordained position, and
a moment’s flagging of intention would defeat the whole purpose of the calculator. And yet,
if we look to results only, no better instance can be found than one of these rows of digits
if it were intended to illustrate what we practically understand by a chance arrangement
of a number of objects. Each digit occurs approximately equally often, and this tendency
developes [sic] as we advance further [...] In fact, if we were to take the whole row of hitherto
calculated figures, cut off the first five as familiar to us all, and contemplate the rest, no one
would have the slightest reason to suppose that these had not come out as the results of a
die with ten equal faces.” [Venn, 1888, p. 111]
But are constants such as pi, e,
√
2, and ln 2 truly normal? Intuitive arguments suggest that normality
must be the rule [Venn, 1888, pp. 111-115] but so far the problem has eluded a rigorous mathematical
proof. In lieu of such a proof, research in experimental mathematics has developed a wide range of tests to
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assess whether or not the hypothesis of normality can be rejected (e.g., [Bailey et al., 2012, Frey, 2009,
Ganz, 2014, Jaditz, 2000, Marsaglia, 2005]; [Tu and Fischbach, 2005, p. 281]), some of which involve
visual methods of data presentation (e.g., [Arago´n Artacho et al., 2012]; [Venn, 1888, p. 118]). In line
with Venn’s conjecture, most tests conclude that for the constants under investigation, the hypothesis
of normality cannot be rejected.
However, to the best of our knowledge only one study has tried to quantify the strength of inductive
support in favor of normality (i.e., [Bailey et al., 2012]). Below we outline a multinomial Bayes factor
test of equivalence that allows one to quantify the evidence in favor of the general law that each digit
occurs equally often.
A Bayes Factor Multinomial Test for Normality
The general law or null hypothesis H0 states that pi, e,
√
2, and ln 2 are normal. Here we consider the
more restricted law that each digit in the decimal expansion occurs equally often (i.e., we focus on series
of length 1 only). Hence, H0 stipulates that θ0j = 110 ∀ j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 9}, where j indexes the digits.
Next we need to specify our expectations under H1, that is, our beliefs about the distribution of digit
occurrences under the assumption that the general law does not hold, and before having seen actual data.
We explore two alternative models. The first model assigns the digit probabilities θj an uninformative
Dirichlet prior D(a = 1); under this alternative hypothesis Ha=11 , all combinations of digit probabilities
are equally likely a priori. In other words, the predictions of Ha=11 are relatively imprecise. The second
model assigns the digit probabilities θj an informative Dirichlet prior D(a = 50); under this alternative
hypothesis Ha=501 , the predictions of Ha=501 are relatively precise, and similar to those made by H0. In
effect, the predictions from Ha=501 are the same as those made by a model that is initialized with an
uninformative Dirichlet prior D(a = 1) which is then updated based on 49 hypothetical occurrences for
each of the ten digits, that is, a hypothetical sequence of a total of 490 digits that corresponds perfectly
with H0.
Thus, model Ha=11 yields predictions that are relatively imprecise, whereas model Ha=501 yields pre-
dictions that are relatively precise. The Bayes factor for H0 versus H1 is an indication of relative
predictive adequacy, and by constructing two very different versions of H1 –one predictively dissim-
ilar to H0, one predictively similar– our analysis captures a wide range of plausible outcomes (e.g.,
[Spiegelhalter et al., 1994]).
With H0 and H1 specified, the Bayes factor for the multinomial test of equivalence
[O’Hagan and Forster, 2004, p. 350] is given by
BF01 =
B(a)
B(a + n)
9∏
j=0
θ
nj
0j
=
B(a)
B(a + n)
9∏
j=0
10−nj ,
(3)
where a and n are vectors of length ten (i.e., the number of different digits); the elements of n contain the
number of occurrences for each of the ten digits. Finally, B(·) is a generalization of the beta distribution
[O’Hagan and Forster, 2004, p. 341]:
B(a) =
∏9
j=0 Γ(aj)
Γ
(∑9
j=0 aj
) , (4)
where Γ(t) is the gamma function defined as Γ(t) =
∫∞
0
xt−1e−x dx. For computational convenience we
4
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use the natural logarithm of the Bayes factor:
log BF01 = logB(a)− logB(a + n)−N log 10, (5)
where N is the total number of observed digits.
Example 1: The Case of pi
In our first example we compute multinomial Bayes factors for the digits of pi. We compute the Bayes
factor sequentially, as a function of an increasing number of available digits, with an upper bound of 100
million. Figure 1 displays the results in steps of 1,000 digits. The Bayes factor that contrasts H0 versus
Ha=11 is indicated by the black line, and it shows that the evidence increasingly supports the general law.
After all 100 million digits have been taken into account, the observed data are 1.86× 1030 times more
likely to occur under H0 than under Ha=11 . The extent of this support is overwhelming. The red line
indicates the maximum Bayes factor, that is, the Bayes factor that is obtained in case the digits were to
occur equally often – that is, hypothetical data perfectly consistent with H0.
The dark grey area in Figure 1 indicates where a frequentist p value hypothesis test would fail to
reject the null hypothesis. This area was determined in two steps. First, we considered the hypothetical
distribution of counts across the ten digit categories and constructed a threshold data set for which H0
has a 5% chance of producing outcomes that are at least as extreme. Second, this threshold data set
was used to compute a Bayes factor, and this threshold Bayes factor is plotted in Figure 1 as the lower
bound of the dark grey area.
In order to construct the threshold data set, the number of counts in each digit category was obtained
as follows. In this multinomial scenario there are nine degrees of freedom. Without loss of generality,
the number of counts in the first eight of ten categories may be set equal to the expected frequency of
N
10 : n0, n1, . . . , n7 =
N
10 . Consequently, the first eight summands of the χ
2-test formula are equal to zero.
Furthermore,
∑9
j=0 nj = N , so that if n8 is known, n9 is determined by n9 =
2
10N −n8. We then obtain
the number of counts in the ninth category n8 by solving the following quadratic equation for n8:
χ295% =
(
n8 − N10
)2
N/10
+
((
2
10 N − n8
)− N10)2
N/10
, (6)
where χ295% denotes the 95-th percentile of the χ
2 distribution with nine degrees of freedom.
Figure 1 shows that the height of the dark grey area’s lower bound increases with N . This means that
it is possible to encounter a data set for which the Bayes factor indicates overwhelming evidence in favor
of H0, whereas the fixed-α frequentist hypothesis test suggests that H0 ought to be rejected. In this way
Figure 1 provides a visual illustration of the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox [Jeffreys, 1961, Lindley, 1957], a
paradox that will turn out to be especially relevant for the later analysis of e,
√
2, and ln 2.
A qualitative similar pattern of results is apparent when we consider the grey line in Figure 1: the
Bayes factor that contrasts H0 versus Ha=501 . Because this model makes predictions that are relatively
similar to those of H0, the data are less diagnostic than before. Nevertheless, the evidence increasingly
supports the general law. After all 100 million digits are observed, the observed data are BF01 =
1.92× 1022 times more likely to occur under H0 than under Ha=501 . The extent of this support remains
overwhelming.
For completeness, we also computed Bayes factors based on the first trillion decimal digits of pi as
reported in [Bailey and Borwein, 2009, p. 11] (not shown). As expected from the upward evidential
trajectories in Figure 1, increasing the sequence length strengthens the support in favor of the general
law: based on one trillion decimal digits, the D(a = 1) prior for H1 yields BF01 = 3.65×1046 (log BF01 =
5
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Figure 1: Sequential Bayes factors in favor of equal occurrence probabilities based on the first 100
million digits of pi. The results in the top part of the panel correspond to an uninformative D(a = 1)
prior for the alternative hypothesis; the results in the lower part of the panel correspond to the use of
an informative D(a = 50) prior. The red lines indicate the maximum possible evidence for H0, and
the grey areas indicate where 95% of the Bayes factors would fall if H0 were true. After 100 million
digits, the final Bayes factor under a D(a = 1) prior is BF01 = 1.86 × 1030 (log BF01 = 69.70); under a
D(a = 50) prior, the final Bayes factor equals BF01 = 1.92×1022 (log BF01 = 51.31). Figure available at
http://tinyurl.com/zelm4o4 under CC license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/.
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107.29)1, and the D(a = 50) prior yields BF01 = 4.07× 1038 (log BF01 = 88.90).
Finally, consider the fact that the two evidential trajectories –one for a comparison against Ha=11 ,
one for a comparison against Ha=501 – have a similar shape and appear to differ only by a constant factor.
This pattern is not a coincidence, and it follows from the nature of sequential updating for Bayes factors
[Jeffreys, 1961, p. 334]. Recall that there exist two mathematically equivalent ways to update the Bayes
factor when new data y2 appear. The first method is to compute a single new Bayes factor using all of
the available observations, BF(y = y1, y2); the second method is to compute a Bayes factor only for the
new data, but based on the posterior distribution that is the result of having encountered the previous
data – this Bayes factor, BF(y2 | y1) is then multiplied by the Bayes factor for the old data, BF(y1) to
yield the updated Bayes factor BF(y = y1, y2).
Now let y1 denote a starting sequence of digits large enough so that the joint posterior distribution
for the θj ’s under Ha=11 is relatively similar to that under Ha=501 (i.e., when the data are said to have
overwhelmed the prior). From that point onward, the change in the Bayes factor as a result of new data
y2, BF(y2 | y1), will be virtually identical for both instantiations of H1. Hence, following an initial phase
of posterior convergence, the subsequent evidential updates are almost completely independent of the
prior distribution on the model parameters.2
Equation 1 shows that the Bayes factor quantifies the change in belief brought about by the data;
as a first derivative of belief (expressed on the log scale), it achieves independence of the prior model
log odds. In turn, Figure 1 illustrates that the change in the log Bayes factor –the second derivative of
belief– achieves independence of the prior distribution on the model parameters, albeit only in the limit
of large samples.
The next three cases concern a study of the irrational numbers e,
√
2, and ln 2; the analysis and
conclusion for these cases echo the ones for the case of pi.
Example 2: The Case of e
In our second example we compute multinomial Bayes factors for the digits of the base of the natural
logaritm: Euler’s number e. Proceeding in similar fashion as for the case of pi, Figure 2 shows the
evidential trajectories (in steps of 1,000 digits) for the first 100 million digits of e.3 As was the case for
pi, the upward trajectories signal an increasing degree of support in favor of the general law. After all
100 million digits have been taken into account, the observed data are 2.61 × 1030 times more likely to
occur under H0 than under Ha=11 , and 2.69×1022 times more likely under H0 than under Ha=501 . Again,
the extent of this support is overwhelming.
Note that, as for the case of pi, the two evidential trajectories –one for a comparison against Ha=11 , one
for a comparison against Ha=501 – have a similar shape and appear to differ only by a constant factor. In
contrast to the case of pi, however, the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox is more than just a theoretical possibility:
Figure 2 shows that the evidential trajectories move outside the grey area when the total digit count is
between 82, 100 and 254, 000, meaning that for those digit counts the frequentist hypothesis test (with
a fixed α-level of .05) suggests that H0 ought to be rejected. For the same data, both Bayes factors
indicate compelling evidence in favor of H0.4
1Such an excessive degree of evidence in favor of a general law may well constitute a world record.
2That is, after a sufficient number of observations, the trajectories of the log Bayes factors for the different priors for
H1 are equal, only shifted by a constant. In fact, regardless of the irrational number under consideration, this constant
–which corresponds to the difference in log(BFa=101 ) and log(BF
a=50
01 )– approaches 18.39 (for a derivation see https:
//osf.io/m5jas/).
3Data were obtained using the pifast software (numbers.computation.free.fr/Constants/PiProgram/pifast.html).
4A frequentist statistician may object that this is a sequential design whose proper analysis demands a correction of the
α level. However, the same data may well occur in a fixed sample size design. In addition, the frequentist correction of α
levels is undefined when the digit count increases indefinitely.
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Figure 2: Sequential Bayes factors in favor of equal occurrence probabilities based on the first 100
million digits of e. The results in the top part of the panel correspond to an uninformative D(a = 1)
prior for the alternative hypothesis; the results in the lower part of the panel correspond to the use of
an informative D(a = 50) prior. The red lines indicate the maximum possible evidence for H0, and
the grey areas indicate where 95% of the Bayes factors would fall if H0 were true. After 100 million
digits, the final Bayes factor under a D(a = 1) prior is BF01 = 2.61 × 1030 (log BF01 = 70.04); under a
D(a = 50) prior, the final Bayes factor equals BF01 = 2.69×1022 (log BF01 = 51.65). Figure available at
http://tinyurl.com/h3wenqo under CC license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/.
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Figure 3: Sequential Bayes factors in favor of equal occurrence probabilities based on the first 100 million
digits of
√
2. The results in the top part of the panel correspond to an uninformative D(a = 1) prior
for the alternative hypothesis; the results in the lower part of the panel correspond to the use of an
informative D(a = 50) prior. The red lines indicate the maximum possible evidence for H0, and the
grey areas indicate where 95% of the Bayes factors would fall if H0 were true. After 100 million digits,
the final Bayes factor under a D(a = 1) prior is BF01 = 7.29 × 1030 (log BF01 = 71.06); under a
D(a = 50) prior, the final Bayes factor equals BF01 = 7.52×1022 (log BF01 = 52.67). Figure available at
http://tinyurl.com/jgwu523 under CC license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/.
Example 3: The Case of
√
2
In our third example we compute multinomial Bayes factors for the digits of
√
2. Proceeding in similar
fashion as above, Figure 3 shows the evidential trajectories (in steps of 1,000 digits) for the first 100
million digits of
√
2.5 As was the case for pi and e, upward evidential trajectories reveal an increasing
degree of support in favor of the general law. After all 100 million digits have been taken into account,
the observed data are 7.29× 1030 times more likely to occur under H0 than under Ha=11 , and 7.52× 1022
times more likely under H0 than under Ha=501 . As before, the extent of this support is overwhelming.
As Figure 3 shows, the analysis of
√
2 provides yet another demonstration of the Jeffreys-Lindley
paradox: when the total digit count ranges between 1 million and 2 million, and between 20 and 40
million (especially close to 40 million), a frequentist analysis occasionally rejects H0 at an α-level of .05
(i.e., the evidential trajectories temporarily leave the grey area) whereas, for the same data, both Bayes
factors indicate compelling evidence in favor of H0.
5Data were obtained using the pifast software (numbers.computation.free.fr/Constants/PiProgram/pifast.html).
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Figure 4: Sequential Bayes factors in favor of equal occurrence probabilities based on the first 100 million
digits of ln 2. The results in the top part of the panel correspond to an uninformative D(a = 1) prior
for the alternative hypothesis; the results in the lower part of the panel correspond to the use of an
informative D(a = 50) prior. The red lines indicate the maximum possible evidence for H0, and the
grey areas indicate where 95% of the Bayes factors would fall if H0 were true. After 100 million digits,
the final Bayes factor under a D(a = 1) prior is BF01 = 7.58 × 1029 (log BF01 = 68.80); under a
D(a = 50) prior, the final Bayes factor equals BF01 = 7.81×1021 (log BF01 = 50.41). Figure available at
http://tinyurl.com/jqdyd3w under CC license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/.
Example 4: The Case of ln 2
In our fourth and final example we compute multinomial Bayes factors for the digits of ln 2. Figure 4
shows the evidential trajectories (in steps of 1,000 digits) for the first 100 million digits of ln 2.6 As
was the case for pi, e, and
√
2, upward trajectories reflect the increasing degree of support in favor
of the general law. After all 100 million digits have been taken into account, the observed data are
7.58 × 1029 times more likely to occur under H0 than under Ha=11 , and 7.81 × 1021 times more likely
under H0 than under Ha=501 . As Figure 4 shows, the analysis of ln 2 provides again a demonstration
of the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox: the evidential trajectories leave the grey area multiple times indicating
that a frequentist analysis rejects H0 at an α-level of .05 whereas, for the same data, both Bayes factors
indicate compelling evidence in favor of H0.
6Data were obtained using the pifast software (numbers.computation.free.fr/Constants/PiProgram/pifast.html).
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Figure 5: Sequential Bayes factors in favor of equal occurrence probabilities based on the first 100 million
digits of pi, e,
√
2, and ln 2. The results correspond to the use of a two component mixture prior of a
D(a1 = 5) and D(a2 = 1/5) Dirichlet distribution where the mixing weight was equal to w = 0.5. The
red lines indicate the maximum possible evidence for H0, and the grey areas indicate where 95% of the
Bayes factors would fall if H0 were true. Figure available at http://tinyurl.com/hw4gmlr under CC
license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/.
11
Bayesian Evidence Accumulation
Alternative Analysis
The analyses presented so far used two different Dirichlet distributions as a prior for the parameter
vector under the alternative hypothesis H1. In this way, we demonstrated that the results do not change
qualitatively when considering an uninformed or an informed Dirichlet prior distribution. A Dirichlet
distribution is commonly used as a prior distribution for the parameter vector of a multinomial likelihood
since it conveniently leads to an analytical solution for the Bayes factor.
However, one might ask whether the results are sensitive to the particular choice of the family of
prior distributions used to specify the alternative hypothesis H1, that is the family of Dirichlet dis-
tributions. To highlight the robustness of our conlusion, we present the results of an analysis that is
based on a more flexible prior distribution than the Dirichlet distribution, namely a two component
mixture of Dirichlet distributions. Mixture distributions have the property that the shape of the den-
sity is extremely flexible and can easily account for skewness, excess kurtosis, and even multi-modality
[Fru¨hwirth–Schnatter, 2006] which makes them an ideal candidate for testing the sensitivity to a wide
range of prior distributions. As [Dalal and Hall, 1983] showed, in fact any prior distribution may be
arbitrarily closely approximated by a suitable mixture of conjugate prior distributions (i.e., prior dis-
tributions that, combined with a certain likelihood, lead to a posterior distribution that is in the same
family of distributions as the prior distribution).7
As an example, we considered a two component mixture of a D(a1 = 5) Dirichlet distribution which
assigns more mass to probability vectors that have components that are similar to each other (i.e.,
similar digit probabilities) and a D(a2 = 1/5) Dirichlet distribution which assigns more mass to the
corners of the simplex (i.e., one digit probability dominates) where the mixing weight was equal to
w = 0.5.8 It is easily shown that also under this prior choice, the Bayes factor is available analytically.
Recall that the Bayes factor is defined as BF01 =
p(data|H0)
p(data|H1) . p(data | H0) is obtained by inserting
θ0j =
1
10 ∀ j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 9} into the multinomial likelihood. In order to obtain p(data | H1), we use the
fact that any mixture of conjugate prior distributions is itself conjugate, that is, leads to a posterior
distribution that is again a mixture of the same family of distributions, only with updated parameters
[Dalal and Hall, 1983]. Hence, since the Dirichlet distribution is conjugate to the multinomial likelihood,
the posterior distribution when using a mixture of Dirichlet distributions as a prior is again a mixture of
Dirichlet distributions (with updated parameters). This implies that we know the normalizing constant
of the posterior distribution under the alternative hypothesis H1 which is equivalent to p(data | H1).
Hence, we can calculate the Bayes factor as follows:
BF01 =
p(data | H0)
p(data | H1)
=
N !
n0!n1!...n9!
∏9
j=0 θ
nj
0j∫
Θ
N !
n0!n1!...n9!
∏9
j=0 θ
nj
j
(
w 1B(a1)
∏9
j=0 θ
a1j−1
j + (1− w) 1B(a2)
∏9
j=0 θ
a2j−1
j
)
dθ
=
∏9
j=0 θ
nj
0j
w 1B(a1)
∫
Θ
∏9
j=0 θ
a1j+nj−1
j dθ + (1− w) 1B(a2)
∫
Θ
∏9
j=0 θ
a2j+nj−1
j dθ
=
∏9
j=0 θ
nj
0j
w B(a1+n)B(a1) + (1− w)
B(a2+n)
B(a2)
.
(7)
Figure 5 displays the results for the 100 million digits of the four irrational numbers that are based
on the two component mixture prior described above. For pi, the final Bayes factor equals 1.41 × 1027;
7Of course, in some cases this may require a very “rich” mixture, that is, a mixture prior with many components.
8R code that allows one to explore how the results change for a different choice of a two component Dirichlet mixture
prior is available on the Open Science Framework under https://osf.io/cmn2z/.
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for e, the final Bayes factor equals 1.97× 1027; for √2, the final Bayes factor equals 5.52× 1027; for ln 2
the final Bayes factor equals 5.73× 1026.
The results based on the mixture prior are very similar to the previous ones, that is, we again obtain
overwhelming support in favor of the assumption that all digits occur equally often; hence, we conclude
that inference appears to be relatively robust to the particular choice of prior distribution that is used.
Discussion and Conclusion
With the help of four examples we illustrated how Bayesian inference can be used to quantify evidence in
favor of a general law [Jeffreys, 1961]. Specifically, we examined the degree to which the data support the
conjecture that the digits in the decimal expansion of pi, e,
√
2, and ln 2 occur equally often. Our main
analysis featured two prior distributions used to instantiate models as alternatives to the general law:
the alternative model Ha=501 resembled the general law, whereas the alternative model Ha=11 did not.
An infinite number of plausible alternatives and associated inferences lie in between these two extremes.
Regardless of whether the comparison involved Ha=501 or Ha=11 , the evidence was always compelling and
the sequential analysis produced evidential trajectories that reflected increasing support in favor of the
general law. Future data can update the evidence and extend these trajectories indefinitely.
Figures 1–4 clearly show the different outcomes for Ha=501 versus Ha=11 . This dependence on the
model specification is sometimes felt to be a weakness of the Bayesian approach, as the specification
of the prior distribution for the model parameters is not always straightforward or objective. However,
the dependence on the prior distribution is also a strength, as it allows the researcher to insert relevant
information into the model to devise a test that more closely represents the underlying theory. Does
it make sense to assign the model parameters a Dirichlet D(a = 50) prior? It is easy to use existing
knowledge about the distribution of trillions of digits for pi to argue that this Dirichlet distribution is
overly wide and hence inappropriate; however, this conclusion confuses prior knowledge with posterior
knowledge – as the name implies, the prior distribution should reflect our opinion before and not after
the data have been observed.
In the present work we tried to alleviate concerns about the sensitivity to the prior specification
in three ways. First, for our main analysis, we used a sandwich approach in which we examined the
results for two very different prior distributions, thereby capturing a wide range of outcomes for alter-
native specifications (e.g., [Spiegelhalter et al., 1994]). Second, we considered a different, very flexible
family of alternative prior distributions (i.e., a two component mixture of Dirichlet distributions) and
we demonstrated that the results do not change qualitatively – the evidence in favor of the general law
remains overwhelming. Third, we have shown that the second derivative of belief –the change in the
Bayes factor as a result of new data– becomes insensitive to the prior specification as N grows large.
Here, the evidential trajectories all suggest that the evidence for the general law increases as more digits
become available. Figure 6 displays the results for pi, e,
√
2, and ln 2 side-by-side and emphasizes that for
all four irrational numbers that we investigated, we obtain similar overwhelming support for the general
law which states that all digits occur equally often – this is the case for all three prior distributions that
we considered.
A remaining concern is that our Dirichlet prior on Ha=501 may be overly wide and therefore bias
the test in favor of the general law. To assess the validity of this concern we conducted a simulation
study in which the normality assumption was violated: one digit was given an occurrence probability
of .11, whereas each of the remaining digits were given occurrence probabilities of .89/9. Figure 7
shows that for all 1, 000 simulated data sets, the evidential trajectories indicate increasing evidence
against the general law. After 1 million digits, the average Bayes factor in favor of the alternative
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Figure 6: Sequential Bayes factors in favor of equal occurrence probabilities based on the first 100
million digits of pi, e,
√
2, and ln 2. The results in the upper panel correspond to the use of an unin-
formative D(a = 1) prior for the alternative hypothesis; the results in the middle panel correspond to
the use of an informative D(a = 50) prior; the results in the lower panel correspond to the use of a
two component mixture prior of a D(a1 = 5) and D(a2 = 1/5) Dirichlet distribution where the mix-
ing weight was equal to w = 0.5. Figure available at http://tinyurl.com/hhut8dp under CC license
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/.
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Figure 7: Sequential Bayes factors in favor of equal occurrence probabilities for 1, 000 simulated data sets
of 1 million digits each. In every data set, one digit was given an occurrence probability of .11 whereas
each of the other digits occurred with probability .89/9. The evidential trajectories indicate increasingly
strong evidence against the general law. Figure available at http://tinyurl.com/j4qk2ht under CC
license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/.
hypothesis is BF10 = 1.19×10214 (log BF10 = 492.93) under the D(a = 1) prior and BF10 = 8.88×10221
(log BF10 = 511.05) under the D(a = 50) prior. Thus, with our instantiations of H1 the Bayes factor is
able to provide overwhelming evidence against the general law when it is false.
One of the main challenges for Bayesian inference in the study of normality for fundamental constants
is to extend the simple multinomial approach presented here to account for longer digit sequences. As
the digit series grows large, the number of multinomial categories also grows while the number of unique
sequences decreases. Ultimately, this means that even with trillions of digits, a test for normality may
lack the data for a diagnostic test. Nevertheless, alternative models of randomness can be entertained
and given a Bayesian implementation – once this is done, the principles outlined by Jeffreys can be used
to quantify the evidence for or against the general law.
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